



This is a short summary of my new interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy, 
including metaphysics and dynamics. Monadology is the core of his philosophy, but 
according to my interpretation, this document must be read together with his 
works on dynamics and geometry Analysis Situs, among others. Monadology 
describes the reality, the world of monads. But in addition, it also contains a theory 
of information in terms of the state transition of monads, together with a sketch of 
how that information is transformed into the phenomena via coding. I will argue 
that Leibniz’s program has a surprisingly wide range, from classical physics to the 
theories of relativity (special and general) , and extending even to quantum 
mechanics.
?? How should we read Monadology?
Among Leibniz’s papers he completed in his last years, the one that should be 
regarded as containing the core of his system of knowledge is Monadology (1714). It 
is a theory of metaphysics, but I take it that Leibniz thought that it is the foundation 
of dynamics, and he envisaged that dynamics should be combined with his new 
geometry, called Analysis Situs. 
There are two firm grounds for the preceding assertion. The first is that Leibniz 
sketched the relationship between his metaphysics and dynamics, in the two papers  
New System and Specimen Dynamicum (both published in 1695; English tr. in Ariew 
and Garber 1989). If we wish to figure out a reasonable interpretation of 
Monadology, this ground must be taken very seriously.
The second ground is the amazing accomplishments shown in The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Mathematics (written around the same time as Monadology; English tr. 
in Loemker 1969). Monadology was found from the large heap of manuscripts and 
published in 1720 by German translation. But very few scholars, since then, seem to 
have tried to read Leibniz’s metaphysics together with his dynamics and geometry 
called Analysis Situs (this has been thoroughly studied by De Risi 2007). The 
Metaphysical Foundations contained many updated results of his geometry in 
conjunction with many important insights as regards the relation between 
metaphysics and geometry; and we can find even his attempt at unifying dynamics 
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and geometry. Here, we have to recall his famous saying that “everything is 
connected”. Unless we try to understand his metaphysics in connection with 
dynamics and geometry, at least, we cannot obtain any good interpretation of 
Leibniz’s philosophy.
I have come across Leibniz’s philosophy in the process of examining the theories of 
space and time based on modern physics. Since then, I have spent a little more than 
ten years for my study of Leibniz. And only recently I have published a book on 
Leibniz, describing my own reading, called “Informational Interpretation of 
Monadology” (first appeared as Uchii 2009, and the updated version is Uchii 2016). 
The crucial idea of this interpretation is that we have to extract Leibniz’s “theory of 
information” from Monadology and other texts. Indeed, I have found out that 
Monadology contained such a theory, since Leibniz had to connect his ontology with 
a theory of the state-transition of each monad, and also with mental and physical 
phenomena. Needless to say, he did not know the modern theory of information (in 
the 20th and 21st century); however, I will claim that his Monadology can be 
understood only in terns of the viewpoint and concepts of the theory of 
information. The present paper is going to show how we can obtain a better view, 
not only of Monadology, but of the overall structure of Leibniz’s philosophy, 
especially as a philosophy of physics.
  
2. The Theory of Monads presupposes Coding and Programming
Already in New System, Leibniz said that each monad (simple substance) can be 
likened to a spiritual automaton, and it is governed by an internal force (primitive 
force) . This force is easily understood in terms of the state-transition function of a 
monad; alternatively, we may say each monad is programmed (by God) to work 
harmoniously with other monads, and changes its state (perception) accordingly. 
Further, in Specimen Dynamicum, he said that this primitive force (in a monad) is 
transformed into the derivative force in the phenomenal world. This statement can 
be simply translated as: the derivative force is a coded appearance of the primitive 
force. “Coded” because the primitive force belongs to reality (the sphere of 
monads), but the derivative force belongs to the phenomena, how the reality is 
represented to intelligent creatures like humans. In order to connect two entirely 
different spheres, we need coding. Further, notice that any monad’s states 
(perceptions) themselves represent the whole reality, the sphere of the monads. Thus 
we have to assume at least two different systems of coding, one for states 
(perceptions, which occur in reality), another for phenomena. These must be 
different, because Leibniz consistently says that there is no space and no time in 
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reality whereas phenomena (including motion) occur in space and time (see Uchii 
2015b, and for a concise presentation see 2015a). This is a crucial point for 
understanding Leibniz’s metaphysics.
In any case, it is clear that in order to make sense of Leibniz’s assertions about 
monads and phenomena, we have to conclude that he presupposed the notion of 
coding, despite the fact that he never used this word. And we have to further notice 
that programming is inseparable from coding. Take an obvious example of a Turing-
machine. Any Turing machine (its state-transition vis-à-vis its tape)  can be 
programmed but any such programs must be linked with coding, how a natural 
number is represented on the tape. Likewise, God, the ultimate programmer of 
reality cannot make any program without using some coding, and this is logically 
necessary.
3. The Range of Monadology
Many readers may wonder why we have to dig into Leibniz’s philosophy which is 
quite old, at least 300 years old! For these skeptical readers, I will argue that 
Leibniz’s program has a surprisingly wide range, from classical physics to the 
theories of relativity (special and general), and extending even to quantum physics. 
Thus his program should be quite instructive for many philosophers of science.
The reason why his philosophy can have such a wide range is easy to understand: 
the separation of reality from the phenomenal world, and connecting these two 
spheres by means of code, or we should say, by means of various systems of 
coding. The single monadic world (reality) is governed by the law of state-
transition of each monad (programmed by God). And Leibniz consistently says this 
reality has neither space nor time, nor any quantities. But this reality can be 
represented (via coding) quantitatively in the phenomena, and thereby the law of 
the state-transition of reality can be transformed into quantitative laws; I say “laws” 
because any such representation in the phenomena is always incomplete and 
therefore a mere homomorphism, not any isomorphism. Thus for creatures with finite 
abilities such as humans, knowledge of the laws governing the phenomenal world 
should be partial, and not unified. Classical mechanics, special relativity, or 
quantum mechanics can at best represent partially the structure of reality. Although 
Leibniz had no knowledge of relativity theories or quantum physics, I am sure he 
would say as follows: these are different attempts at decoding God’s coding and the 
law of reality; and because of incompleteness of any such attempts of decoding, 
unification of all of them is quite hard. Aside from incomplete data from the 
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phenomenal world, the difference and incompleteness of decoding become 
stumbling blocks for unification.
4. Space, Time, and Dynamics
Let us remember Leibniz’s distinction among the phenomena: well-founded and 
otherwise. Phenomena are well-founded if there are their bases in reality.  All right, 
what does this mean? Phenomena are coded messages from reality (the sphere of 
monads), but because of coding, not everything in these messages has a counterpart 
in reality. This is obvious also from the nature of coding which is, generally and 
mathematically, a homomorphism. Unlike isomorphism which is based on one-to-
one correspondence between two spheres, homomorphism is only a partial 
correspondence; so that in these messages there can be many ingredients which 
have nothing to do with reality. Therefore, Leibniz emphasized that there must be, 
in a phenomenon, something that is representing some aspect of reality.  Then, it is 
a well-founded phenomenon.
The preceding remark is crucial when we wish to consider space, time, and motion. 
How are they related with reality, the sphere of monads? We have to distinguish 
space and time in which any phenomena occur from the bases of them in reality. Leibniz 
talks about both spheres very often in one breath; and this misleads most readers. 
However, if we keep the preceding remark in our mind, we can easily come to the 
right answer. In reality (no space, no time), there are monads and relations among 
them. And within each monad, its state-transition is all given at once; there is the 
order of succession of states, which is not time but the basis of time. Likewise, 
monads are not in space, but there are various relations among them; or rather, 
since Leibniz says that organized groups of monads, where each group is governed 
by a single dominant monad (often called anima) , correspond to natural machines 
(divine machines) in the phenomenal world, the relations of these groups are the 
bases of spacial relations, and the totality of the latter is space. As De Risi’s excellent 
work has clarified, Leibniz’s Analysis Situs aimed at revealing the relationship 
between Monadology and the foundations of geometry, the mathematics of space. 
Leibniz’s message is clear: the basis of geometry is qualitative, although the 
geometry of phenomenal world is quantitative (that is, it is determined by what we 
now call metric). This clearly shows that any quantitative geometries are 
determined both by the basis in the monads and the coding from reality to 
phenomena. Of course we do not know God’s coding, so that we have to guess by 
scientific method, such as Newton’s assumption of absoluteness, or the 19th 
!4
century assumption of inertial system, or Einstein’s special or general relativity, etc. 
All the same, Leibniz would say that these are attempts of decoding, i.e. trials of 
discovering the hidden coding. In short, in order to know the law of reality, 
decoding is indispensable, and this aspect of science is clearly informational. That’s 
the point of my informational interpretation of Monadology. In passing, let me note 
that Julian Barbour’s work on “Shape Dynamics” (Barbour 2011) shows a strong 
affinity with Leibniz’s idea, although Barbour does not use the notion of code.
Then what can we say about motion and dynamics? It is well known that Leibniz 
subscribed to the mechanical philosophy, so that the science of motion, dynamics is 
most closely connected with the attempts of knowing reality. For that is directly 
concerned with motions of bodies, which should be representing, in the 
phenomenal world, groups of monads and the state-transitions of any such groups. 
The laws of motion must be regarded as representing the laws of state-transition of 
monads, via coding, in some way. This is clear from Leibniz’s texts on dynamics, 
where he stated the correspondence of the primitive force (in monads) to the 
derivative force (in bodies). According to my interpretation, “derivative force” 
means “coded representation of primitive force,” and I would claim this is the only 
sensible interpretation!
Now, if the preceding point is grasped, it is easy to understand why Leibniz’s 
Monadology can provide a good scenario for unification of physics, even including 
the major branches of modern physics (general relativity and quantum mechanics). 
The bases of space and time, by themselves, are not sufficient for determining the 
structure of the space and time of the phenomenal world; in addition, we have to 
know the coding from these bases to specific metric for space and time, or space-
time. This flexibility is amazing, and it comes solely from coding, and the reality is 
always the same! Thus according to Leibniz’s metaphysics, best theories of physics 
through the history of science can be regarded as different representations of the 
same reality, despite the differences of conceptual apparatus among these theories.
In addition, Leibniz’s metaphysics can suggest a way of unifying two or more 
incompatible theories, like general relativity and quantum mechanics. For, although 
they represent the reality in two incompatible ways, it may well be the case that this 
incompatibility is due to difference of coding. As recent developments of the 
multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics show, there is a promising way to  
understand quantum theory as a deterministic theory (see , e.g., Wallace 2012 and 
Tegmark 2014). Leibniz’s metaphysics has no difficulty for comprehending both 
single reality and multiverse as its representation; each component of multiverse 
seems indeterministic, but taken together, they are governed by a deterministic law 
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(Schrödinger equation), which may be at least a partial representation (homomorphism) 
of the state-transition of the monadic world. And if this picture is on the right track, 
the aim of our ultimate theory should be to find out the whole program of the reality, 
i.e., the law of state-transition of the monadic world. Although I do not think this is 
possible for humans, the dream of physicists presupposes such a possibility. In 
other words, if they insist on realism and the ultimate theory of this reality, the 
Leibnizian metaphysics should be among the candidates of such a theory. Further, 
let me point out that theory-changes as regards the “physicist’s ultimate theory” 
can be easily handled at the level of the representations (i.e. coded appearances)  of 
reality, not reality itself.
The crucial point of Leibniz’s metaphysics is that it can provide (1) the basis of 
space and time, together with (2) the basis of the law of state-transition of the 
phenomenal world. We know neither, of course. But if we assume that there is the 
ultimate reality together with the ultimate program for the phenomenal world 
(multiverse), then we are coming closer to Leibniz’s scenario.
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